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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes how organizational restructuring is affecting managerial labor
markets. Drawing on field research from several Bell operating companies plus a detailed
survey of managers in one company, this paper considers how organizational restructuring
affects the employment levels, the nature of work, and the career trajectories of lower and
middle level line managers. Does restructuring lead to a loss or managerial power and a
convergence in the working conditions of managerial and nonmanagerial workers? Or,
conversely, do managers stand to gain from the flattening of hierarchies and devolution of
decision-making to lower organizational levels?
The paper's central argument is that a new vision of organization has taken hold -- o e
that replaces "bureaucracy" with "enterprise." This vision, however, entails sharp contradictions
because it relies on two competing approaches to organizational reform: one that relies on
decentralizing management to lower levels to enhance customer responsiveness; the other that
relies on reengineering and downsizing to realize scale economies. While the first approach
views lower and middle managers as central to competitiveness, the second views them as
indirect costs to be minimized. The central question is whether or how the two approaches can
be reconciled. The evidence from this case study shows that restructuring has had the
unintended consequence of creating new organizational cleavages: between lower and middle
level managers on the one hand, and top managers on the other.
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From Bureaucracy to Enterprise?
The Changing Jobs and Careers of Managers
in Telecommunications Services
Introduction
In response to technological change and product market deregulation, longstanding U.S.
telecommunications firms are radically restructuring their business strategies and organizations
to improve competitiveness. While the popular and business press as well as academic
researchers have focused attention on the dramatic changes occurring in the collapse of
industry boundaries, mega-mergers, and the rise of new strategic alliances, they have largely
ignored how these structural changes are profoundly altering the employment and careers of
employees. In the Bell operating companies, where bureaucracy is seen as the major obstacle
to competitiveness, managerial workers are a significant target of reform because they are
equated with bureaucracy and comprise approximately a quarter of the workforce.
This chapter analyzes how organizational restructuring is affecting managerial labor
markets -- the jobs, careers, and employment levels of line managers in Bell operating
companies. It addresses a series of questions. How, for example, does organizational
restructuring affect both employment levels and the nature of managerial work -- the division of
labor between the managerial and nonmanagerial workforce? How does it affect the career
trajectories of lower and middle level managers? Are these changes leading to a loss or
managerial power and a convergence in the working conditions of managerial and
non-managerial workers? Or, conversely, do managers stand to gain from the flattening of
hierarchies and devolution of decision-making to lower organizational levels? Who wins and
who loses in the process? Do new organizational cleavages and conflicts arise as a result?
The paper's central argument is that a new vision of organization has taken hold -- o e
that replaces "bureaucracy" with "enterprise." This vision is found both in management and
academic literature and in corporate offices. But the vision entails sharp contradictions that have
unintended consequences: new cleavages between lower and middle level managers on the
one hand, and top managers on the other. The new vision relies on two competing approaches
to organizational reform. The first approach begins with human resources and relies heavily on
decentralizing management to lower levels. It draws on ideas from organizational behavior,
strategic human resource management and industrial relations, and total quality. It views
competitive advantage as emanating from entrepreneurial ism and innovation at the point of
customer contact. According to this logic, lower and middle managers have new, dynamic roles
to play; their jobs must be redesigned to give them more opportunities to be creative and more
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autonomy to make decisions to meet customer needs. Supportive human resource practices
include training in new skills (human resource management, business, marketing) as well as
incentives (career opportunities, employment security, compensation) to inspire organizational
commitment. The approach attempts to simulate small business enterprise in large firms.
The second approach begins with technology and engineering. It focuses on realizing
scale economies through system-wide innovations. Organizational consolidations, new
applications of technology, reengineering, and downsizing are all vehicles for enhancing
efficiency and cutting costs. Rather than relying on decentralized discretion, this macro
approach privileges the centralized decisions of top managers, consultants, and engineers --
decisions that ripple through organizations to lower levels. Changes in the design of jobs and
human resource practices flow as a consequence of new technologies and organizational
restructuring. Because companies cannot make prior commitments to job enhancement or
employment security, the two approaches are often in conflict. The central question is whether
or how the two approaches can be reconciled.
In the case of the former Bell system companies, since divestiture in 1984, the second
logic has dominated the first for at least two reasons. First, top management views bureaucracy
as the most serious obstacle to competitiveness (in contrast to manufacturing firms that view
mass production modes as relics to be discarded). Second, advances in new digital and fiber
optic technologies allow companies to reap even greater scale economies than they have in the
past. The integrated nature or "systemness" of the telecommunications services industry makes
centralization and consolidation an attractive approach to industrial organization. These
centralized approaches have undermined the entrepreneurial and job enhancing approach to
quality service that total quality theorists and others advocate. Top management has created
contradictions for lower and middle managers along several dimensions. First, while new
performance systems evaluate middle managers on the basis of broad customer service
measures, top managers are judged by shareholders on the basis of narrower financial criteria.
Second, while middle managers now have greater authority and responsibility for meeting
performance goals, they lack the necessary control over budgets and operational decisions
needed to get the job done -- control that "real entrepreneurs" or small businessmen have.
Third, they have higher work loads with fewer financial or promotional rewards. Fourth, while
their new role requires increased discretionary effort, creativity, and commitment to the firm,
firms have simultaneously decreased their long-term employment commitments to managers. In
the past, the AT&T system created a seamless web of loyalty that rose through seven layers of
management, with all employees unified around the goal of public service. In the present, the
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incentives and rewards for top management are at odds with those experienced by lower level
managers, who feel resentment and a sense of betrayal.
This argument draws on evidence from extensive qualitative field research and
quantitative data collection in several regional Bell operating companies. It uses the results of a
comprehensive survey conducted in 1994 of 330 lower and middle level line managers in one
operating company. The survey asked employees how work organization and human resource
practices were changing and how these changes affected their jobs and careers.
It is organized as follows. The next section reviews the dominant literature that has
shaped the corporate thinking on restructuring. Section three briefly describes the
telecommunications industry context - the way the old system worked and how and why it is
crumbling under the weight of technological change, national deregulation, and globalization of
markets. Section four provides a detailed examination of how changes in business strategy and
structure at the firm level are reshaping the employment levels, jobs, and careers of lower and
middle level line managers. Conclusions follow.
Theoretical Perspectives
Two quite different views of the outcomes of corporate restructuring for managers have
emerged in the last decade. On the one hand, the popular and business press provide
numerous anecdotes of unemployed managers who are victims of corporate downsizing (Fisher
1991; Cowan and Barron 1992; Zachery 1993). Researchers note the "collapse of internal labor
markets" for managers and the growing similarity of employment conditions for managers and
workers – for example, in the decline in managerial employment security. Researchers have
also identified the loss of power and authority of supervisors when firms introduce employee
participation or self-managing teams into production-level jobs (Klein 1984; Schlesinger and
Klein 1988).
On the other hand, the same press carries images of the new manager, the "product
champion" and innovator: corporate restructuring gets rid of bureaucracy and frees up middle
and lower level managers to be more entrepreneurial. Participatory management allows
managers to gain from workers' creativity; self-managed teams free up managers from
administrative chores. These conflicting views also arise in different strands of the business
school and academic literature. The arguments grow out of a rejection of bureaucratic
organization and mass production as incongruent with global markets that demand low cost,
high quality, reduced cycle time, flexibility, and innovation.
The excellence literature, for example argued for making all managers into
entrepreneurs (Peters and Waterman 1982; Peters and Austin 1985; Peters 1987). In stark
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contrast to the dominant literature of earlier periods which focused on top managers as the sole
source of creativity and innovation (Barnard 1946; Drucker 1967; Mintzburg 1973; Kotter 1982),
writers in the 80s argued for loosely-couple organizations with "lean staff" that would create
room for innovators across layers and departments of management. By recreating market-like
conditions inside large organizations, or "small in large organizations" (Drucker 1988),
managers would have greater incentives to initiate change and would take greater ownership
over their productive units. The resource mobilization literature, spearheaded by Rosabeth
Moss Kanter, went further in arguing that middle managers were the real source of innovation in
large firms (I 982a, 1982b, 1983). New managerial ladders could provide greater opportunities --
a shift from narrow, functionally-based careers to a variety of ways of making it to the top
(Kanter 1984).
Another stream of literature, the strategic human resource management literature, called
on management to link their business strategies and human resource strategies to improve
performance (Tichy, Fombrun, and Devanna 1982; Beer et. al. 1985). Business School faculty
and management consultants emphasized performance-enhancing human resource policies
(training, participation, compensation) (e.g., Lawler 1986). While the "control to commitment"
strategy (Walton 1985) originally focused more on the nonmanagerial workforce, the ideas apply
equally to the treatment of managers as employees.
Economists and compensation specialists developed a complementary argument in the
"new economics of personnel" literature which called for "market-like" pay systems in large firms
to improve incentive structures. This involved reducing the percentage of fixed-base pay or
salary while increasing at-risk pay and linking an individual's pay to his or her contribution
(pay-for-performance) (Lazear 1992; Shuster and Zingheim 1992; Gerhart, Milkovich, and
Murray 1992).
Industrial relations scholars additionally pointed to the need for middle managers to stop
fighting over grievances and to learn to negotiate with union leaders in joint
productivity-enhancing committees. Where unions existed, there was a greater likelihood of
successful and broadbased adoption of performance-enhancing innovations by the workforce if
union leaders embraced the experiments (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986).
Reengineering and macro restructuring approaches, by contrast, call for system-wide
analysis of work processes and the elimination of all redundant work, no matter what the
consequences for jobs and human resource practices (Hammer and Champy 1992).
Some believe that these alternative visions provide a basis for a unified new vision of
organization -- from a "bureaucratic culture" to an "enterprise culture" in the firm (Ray 1986). But
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researchers have rarely examined the vision in light of empirical reality -- the competing claims
that alternate approaches to reform make on managerial employees. As argued above, the
reality of this change is often contradictory and may be summarized as follows. First, there
should be fewer managerial jobs and opportunities for promotion. Second, the jobs that remain
should be more interesting and challenging. Third, the ones that remain should be more
contingent on productivity and accountability, offering less income and employment security.
The scant empirical literature on the changing nature of managerial jobs and careers also
suggests very mixed results for firms and managers (See Fulop 1991 for a review) as well as
wide variation in the outcomes (Heckscher 1992). Managerial jobs may be more interesting, but
there are fewer of them, and they no longer carry implicit long term contracts and employment
or income security. For managers, some may benefit and rise quickly; others may lose their
jobs; others may both benefit and lose along different dimensions of their jobs and careers --
having more powerful but more stressful jobs, more challenging but less stable careers. The
challenge for empirical research is to untangle how these themes play out with differently
situated managers -- in different industries, corporate settings, managerial levels, functional
areas, and professional occupations -- distinctions that have rarely been made in the
managerial literature.
Managerial .lobs in Telecommunications Services: 1950-1980
The AT&T bureaucracy and the managerial jobs that occupied it grew dramatically
between 1950 and 1980. Managerial jobs grew in absolute numbers by 50% between 1950 and
1960; by 60% between 1960 and 1970, and by 47% between 1970 and 1980. By contrast,
despite the overall expansion of the AT&T market, nonmanagerial jobs rose by only 4.6% in the
first decade, 23% in the second, and 2.7% in the third. Automation eliminated low-skilled work.
The proportion of managers in the total AT&T workforce grew from 13.5% in 1950 to 29.4% in
1980. The ratio of all managers to all nonmanagers at AT&T was 1:6.3 in 1950 and 1:2.4 in
1980. Table I compares the relative growth of managerial and nonmanagerial jobs.
 Insert Table I Here
There are two probable explanations for this transformation. The most important
concerns AT&T's strategic response to increased regulatory oversight in the post World War II
period, which put pressure on the company to cut costs and reduce rates while expanding
universal service. Regulators required detailed performance measurements and accountability.
AT&T attempted to meet cost-minimization requirements through the logic of mass production:
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using electromechanical technology to reap scale economies, improve productivity, and lower
costs in the provision of a high volume standardized product (voice transmission). But most jobs
in telephone service were not susceptible to Taylorism or machine-p ing -- only operator jobs
were. By contrast, network required (and continues to require) a highly skilled and autonomous
field staff; and the business office provided customized service through "universal service
representatives" until the early 1980s. Jobs that could not be machine-p ed were heavily
supervised, and this difference is evident in variation in spans of control across occupational
groups. In one representative Bell operating company, for example, by 1980 the ratio of firstline
supervisors to workers was 1:6 in network crafts, 1:8-10 in customer services, and 1:20 in
operator services.
A second factor contributing to the increase in managers was the growth of independent
unionism and the threat of strikes in the post World War II period, which led AT&T to seek ways
of shifting work out of the bargaining unit to staff managers or "subject matter experts"; this
strategy has accelerated in the post-divestiture period, according to trade unionists.
Despite the growth in bureaucracy, productivity in telecommunications services
(measured as employees per 10,000 access lines) grew by 5.9% per year between 1967 and
1988 -- over five times the average rate of 1.1 percent for the nonfarm business sector -- and
ten times the rate of 0.8% in services (U.S. DOL 1990:10-12; Waldstein 1988:Table 4).
Managerial Jobs
In contrast to the literature on managerial labor markets which views the flexible
deployment of managers as a raison d'etre for their employment security (Osterman 1988),
most management jobs in the Bell system were highly regimented and functionally specialized.
They resembled much more the Taylorism of industrial labor markets than the breadth
commonly associated with managerial or salaried labor markets. There were seven layers of
management leading up to officers in the operating companies and at AT&T. The primary role of
supervisors and managers was to monitor and enforce work discipline. Standard operating
procedures set at the top created relatively non-thinking jobs that required implementing policies
down the chain of command, enforcing discipline, and funneling numbers back up. The
top-down, command and control management style at AT&T has led several observers to
compare it to the military. For example:
AT&T is to the Bell System what a general staff is to an army, and AT&T seems
somewhat proud of the parallel. A company writer calls the military-modeled
general staff ‘the greatest contribution to the art of management' of the first half
of the twentieth century; pridefully he notes that AT&T adapted for its own use
many of the staff concepts developed by Frederick the Great, Von Steuben, and
Napoleon ....
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A traffic manager in the smallest of Bell offices reports to the traffic manager
directly above him in the next largest office area to district to regional to operating
company and ultimately to 195 Broadway ['AT&T's Pentagon'] - just as an Army
G-1 officer has counterpart from battalion level all the way up to the Defense
Department .... (Goulden 1968:17)
AT&T transfers men as freely among the operating companies as the U.S. Army
does among its divisions" (Goulden 1968:22).
The military culture may also have been enhanced by AT&T's frequent recruitment of
veterans, a rich source of experienced people with radio, communications, and electronics
skills. In addition, in the post World War II period, management by numbers became the norm,
and to many, an obsession. The Bell system measured the performance of managers as the
aggregate of the performance of workers under them. If top management demanded better
numbers, middle and lower managers felt squeezed, and in turn, pressured workers.
Detailed measurement systems were at least in part a response to federal and state
regulators who increasingly sought to gain control over rates and service quality. State PUCs,
for example, set performance standards for network operations, from the length of time to repair
a service outage to safety standards required during routine installation and repair. Each
functional department in the telephone companies developed its own system of record-keeping
and internal performance measures as demanded by the state PUCs, and these measures were
unique to the functional specialization of the department. The company tended to emphasize
quantitative measures or output per unit input -- tasks per day for network crews or seconds per
call or call-waiting time for operators or customer service representatives. But PUCs also
emphasized quality and service -- in network, for example, the repair of service within a
twenty-four hour period. Moreover, in the telephone service industry, quantity and quality are of
service are closely linked because good service is timely service. In customer services, for
example, average waiting time is a key indicator of service quality because customers place
heavy emphasis on quick response in judging service quality. As one long-time manager in the
Bell system commented, "...the telephone company has always been obsessed with quality,
probably too much so. For example, we used to require that a customer call be answered in two
rings. That was our own internal measure, but maybe we didn't really need that -- and it was
expensive" (Interview 57:8/11/93).
The system of functionally-specific measures reinforced separation and "turf' competition
between managers in different departments. Maximizing efficiencies in one department,
however, often undermined efficiencies in another. Maximizing tasks per day in network, for
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example, creates incentives for network craft workers to find quick fixes to problems; but such
quick fixes may result in repeat repair calls for repair attendants and construction work to repair
the deteriorated network. Functionally-b sed measurement systems, therefore, created
managers that were "efficiency-minded," but narrow in perspective, and this often resulted in
overall inefficiencies. As companies began to mechanize record-k eping and measurement
systems in the 1970s and 1980s, they simply computerized the inefficiencies in the old system.
Because the PUCs were so important in setting rate structures and performance
requirements, the telephone companies geared their managerial structure towards meeting the
demands of the PUC. The state telephone company president held the most important political
position as an official reporting to the PUC. Regulatory was viewed internally as playing a public
relations role, massaging the interface between the telephone company and the members of the
PUC as well as state politicians who periodically voted on rate hikes.
AT&T’s concern for public image translated into a corporate emphasis on employee
involvement in community service, such as for example, "The Pioneers," which involved
thousands of volunteers from Bell companies in community service activities. Employees were
expected to play leadership roles in community organizations such as the Jaycees, and those
who did so were looked on favorably for their leadership potential.
A detailed account of AT&T’s attempts to manipulate public opinion in its favor traces the
company policies to the 1910s and 1920s: "Every employee in the Bell System is considered a
potential public relations representative. Telephone company employees, as a class, are
gracious and accommodating. This is no accident. The uniformity of behavior is the result of
design. Employees are selected and trained by the company as public relations agents,
because it is believed that through constant cultivation of public sympathy, telephone
companies will have less trouble in getting increased rates and in opposing adverse legislation"
(Danielian 1939:281).1
While this research captures the cynical side of AT&T's manipulation of public
perceptions, many employees took seriously their public service mission and participation in
community affairs. For example, the portrait of telephone company managers in a study by
Howard and Bray is one of responsible public servants who took pride in their work. "Compared
to managers in other organizations, they were more emotionally stable but less daring and more
bound by rules. As managers of a government-controlled monopoly, they were less 'dollar'
conscious in a proprietorship sense, but assumed social responsibility for the service the
telephone business provided and had a real sense of obligation to the community" (Williams
and Peterfreund, cited in Howard and Bray 1988:36). In a questionnaire administered by
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Howard and Bray, these managers consistently scored high in terns of their pride in their jobs
and their overall job satisfaction (Howard and Bray 1988:132).
Internal Labor Markets
Internal labor markets in the Bell system -- the formal and informal rules governing
managers' jobs and careers -- reflected the company's bureaucratic and functionally-specialized
organization. Career ladders were long and vertical As early as 1910, AT&T began encouraging
loyalty through "The American Plan,"(company- id pensions, sickness and disability benefits,
employee stock options, and an organization of retired and long-service employees). The
company had seniority-based benefits and career ladders filled almost exclusively from within
by the 1920s (Schacht 1985:35-6). The Bell System recruited first level supervisors either from
the rank and file or from the external labor market. Management positions above first level were
filled exclusively from within. They received considerable management training, much of which
was designed to socially and psychologically separate them from workers. Those promoted
from within were particularly encouraged to break all social ties with former co-work s. A
former AT&T employee noted that people came into the system at a young age, received
"heavy socialization" into their managerial role, and lost a sense of themselves in a system that
demanded "total selfless loyalty.”2
Workers who were promoted from the ranks had at least a high school education and
could expect to rise to lower or middle level management in their respective functional
specialties: male network craft, female office workers in the business office or operator services.
External recruits were usually college- ducated, and tended to be placed in positions dispersed
throughout the organization (Plant, Commercial, Engineering, Accounting, Traffic). They were
expected to climb higher, and a select group was "fast-tracked" and chosen to be groomed for
top management, which involved assignments across departments plus mid-career training or
executive development courses. The Bell System provided generous educational allowances
and tuition-aid for college courses and beyond, and many employees availed themselves of
these opportunities' in order to gain promotions.
In a longitudinal study of managers at AT&T, Howard and Bray (1988) document the
advancement of college and non-c llege educated males through management ranks from
1956 to 1976. The modal level of achievement for non-college educated managers was a level
two management position, while that of college-educated managers was level three. In Howard
and Bray's sample of 422 managers (274 college and 148 non-college educated), between 5%
and 10% of non-college educated workers were promoted each year (depending upon the
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year). By contrast, between 15% and 25% of college-educated managers received promotions
in the same period (Howard and Bray 1988:128-9).
Most careers in the Bell system, however, did not resemble a professional development
track. Workers were promoted from within because as supervisors, they had an intimate
knowledge of the technology and job requirements -- of which standard operating procedures
were important, for example, and which were obstacles to getting the job done. Most managers
capitalized on job specific formal and informal knowledge, living out their careers in the same
department or subdepartment. In this setting, informal sponsorship or paternalism was
extremely important for ensuring movement up the ranks. If a subordinate was particularly
skilled and reliable, this sponsorship not only facilitated upward movement, but discouraged
lateral mobility. Some employees say that "good performers" were penalized and became
"stuck" because superiors depended upon them.
What is significant about this portrait is that once divestiture and downsizing began,
managers with long histories in the Bell system and deep functionally-specific knowledge had
few occupational alternatives outside of the system. The skills and knowledge accrued in a Bell
system "career" were not portable. Those who left the system often retired and/or retrained for
entirely new occupations.
In summary, managerial lives in the Bell system were a mixed blessing. Jobs were
highly regimented and uncreative, but had an important ublic service mission. The system
clearly created middle class jobs and management opportunities that otherwise would not have
been available for a population dispersed in small towns, cities, and rural areas across the
country. The system provided lifetime employment security unlike that provided by other large
corporations because AT&T had a guaranteed rate of return and was not seriously affected by
business cycle fluctuations.
Technology Change. Deregulation. and Restructuring: 1980-1994
At divestiture in 1984, the Modified Final Judgement allowed AT&T to participate in
deregulated equipment and long distance markets, but divested AT&T of its 22 local telephone
companies which were consolidated into the current seven regional Bell operating companies
(RBOCs) and which retained their monopoly position in local services. AT&T downsized rapidly,
eliminating over a third of its domestic workforce in the first six years following divestiture but
expanding the relative proportion of managers to 46% (Keefe 1994:29). It restructured into
business units based on market segments, invested heavily in new digital technologies, and
began implementing total quality management. Employee morale plummeted (Keefe 1994:26).
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The regional Bell companies moved more slowly, reducing the workforce by attrition, and
investing in those unregulated markets which the MFJ allowed --such as information services,
cellular, and international services. Cost pressures on phone companies increased in the late
1980s, however, as local access carriers (LACs) such as Metrofiber and Teleport constructed
local fiber loops in metropolitan areas and creamskimed the more lucrative business customers.
Large institutions -- schools, hospitals, universities, utilities -- developed their own private
networks and reduced reliance on phone companies. And cable companies, now wired to
roughly 60 percent of households nationally, are poised to enter the local residential market as
soon as legislation permits. Pending legislation anticipates the substantial deregulation of local
services. Cost pressures also come from changes in rate structures: long distance and other
carriers that pay access fees to the regional Bell companies (fees that historically subsidized
universal local service) have pushed for "cost-based" rates that would unpackage services and
reduce fees.
Changes in business strategy and structure are summarized below and presented in
Table II. First, companies have shifted from a public service mission shaped by engineers and
regulators to a sales-maximizing mentality shaped by finance and marketing departments, and
oriented towards Wall Street. Second they have shifted from a standardized high volume
product market (voice) to a differentiated product market (voice, enhanced services such as
voice massaging, data, video, image). To support this shift they have invested heavily in fiber
cable and broadband integrated services digital networks (ISDN) to allow them to carry high
speed data, voice, video, and imaging and remain technologically competitive.
To respond to new competitive conditions, Bell operating companies developed
organizational strategies that, as argued in Section I, have the unintended consequence of
sending contradictory messages to employees. On the one hand, "micro-level" experiments are
designed to increase employee participation and decentralize decision-making so that
employees can improve customer service. On the other hand, "macro" strategies that centralize
decision-making, streamline the organization, and reduce costs dominate and often undermine
local initiatives. While companies reengineer and downsize to eliminate bureaucracy, they
request increased employee commitment and discretionary effort to enhance service quality.
Managers on the regulated side complain that they are asked to do more with less, while they
observe companies shifting resources to expand lucrative non-regulated markets such as
information services, cellular, and international services.
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-------------------------------
Insert Table II Here
-------------------------------
Similarly, companies are centralizing some functions while decentralizing others. On the
side of centralization, companies are taking advantage of scale economies to consolidate and
standardize operations at the regional level (from what was the state or local telephone level).
Additionally, they have created regional business units defined by market segment (residential,
small business, large business). The difficulty with the business unit structure in
telecommunications is that the network infrastructure serves all segments; critical decisions
regarding choice of technology and operational standards that would be controlled by the
business unit in most other industries are under a separate regional entity because of the
"systemness" or integrated nature of the network.
At the same time that companies have created regional corporate entities and regional
business units defined by market segment, they are attempting to decentralize decisions
regarding customer service, quality, and work organization to the local or "district" level
(analogous to a plant in manufacturing). This idea comes from quality and excellence theorists
that "empowering" managers to "get close to the customer" is the key to continuous
improvement is service quality.
In summary, the direction of change is to hollow out the old state telephone companies,
with key operational decisions shifting either up to the regional corporate or business unit entity
or down to the "district" or local managerial level. This has created tensions between local and
regional, lower and top level managers over operational decisions.
Implications for Managerial Jobs
The implications of these changes in business strategy and structure for lower and
middle level managers can best be understood though a detailed study of one representative
Bell operating company which draws on qualitative and survey data. Since the early 1980s, this
company like other Bell companies began experimenting with ways of improving management
practices, beginning with the union-management Quality of Worklife (QWL) program in 1980
that sought to do away with AT&T's traditional military command and control approach. The
changes for managers stressed new behaviors rather than new skills in the narrower sense of
the term. Management training emphasized a "softer" approach, listening rather than dictating
skills. Managers had to learn to discuss and negotiate with employees and union leaders over
problems as they arose, rather than only in the context of grievances. In the course of the
1980s, the QWL program grew and gave way to more extensive employee involvement, and
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later a total quality program in which lower level managers tapped the ideas of workers to
improve customer service. In the mid 1980s, the company began experimenting with the use of
self-managed teams (SMTs) as a next step in managers "letting-go;" where teams were
introduced, they particularly changed the jobs of firstline supervisors, who became "coaches."
Coaches are supposed to "lead rather than command, inspire rather than demand obedience."
At the same time that participatory experiments were occurring, the company was
centralizing, consolidating, and downsizing. Between 1984 and 1990 the company consolidated
the old telephone companies into one regional entity, merging executive positions, human
resources, regulatory, labor relations, and finance into one corporate organization and
standardizing the network technology across the region. Overall workforce reductions of 25
percent occurred through attrition and an early retirement buyout for managers. Serious efforts
to cut the managerial force began in the 1990s, leading to a reduction of 23.5 percent of
managers by 1993. Approximately half left through early retirement buyouts, another 40%
through transfers to other subsidiaries, and another ten percent by other programs to provide
early exit or extended leaves. These voluntary reductions rippled through the organization,
leaving random holes in staffing levels.
While the company surpassed its goal for reducing management ranks, at least some
managerial positions were subsequently backfilled by promoting nonmanagerial workers into
lower level management positions. By 1993, when top management decided that downsizing
was not occurring at a quick enough pace (line and staff managers still comprised 24.5% of the
workforce, and the ratio of first line supervisors to workers was 1:5.9) the company announced
an across-the-board 10% downsizing, to take place through forced reductions among managers
and attrition among nonmanagers. At least one out of seven management levels was to be
eliminated. The forced reductions broke with the company's tradition of employment security
and sent shock waves through the organization.
Across the Bell companies, current interest in self-managed teams has focused on their
importance as a vehicle for downsizing. With roughly 50 percent of management staff at the
firstline supervisor level, companies view self-managed teams as vehicle for dramatically cutting
indirect labor costs. Managers in different companies have expressed similar experiences: "We
lost so many management jobs that they backed into it [SMTs];" or "This experiment [SMTs]
was viewed as ‘my toy'. Now that we're downsizing, it's being taken seriously." In another
company, a network supervisor said the objective was "...increased span of control. Traditionally
in my area it was 1:5. The company wants to go to 1:30. There's no way to supervise this many,
so the duties of the supervisor have to change." The change to self-managed teams is also
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facilitated through new technologies that electronically monitor the flow of work. This is true not
only in services where information systems track the call handling of operators and customer
service representatives, but in network where handheld computers now allow field technicians
to record work as they complete it.
Supervisors who have learned to become coaches appear to like the job better because
they are freed up to get out in the field more and do less paperwork. Because their work
involves more coordination, less direct disciplining and supervision, their jobs look more like
those of middle managers, and in this sense they are enhanced. By contrast, firstline
supervisors who continue with traditional responsibilities express frustration over their jobs
because administrative tasks are heavy and downsizing has led workloads to increase. A
company-sponsored survey of network supervisors found that only one-third of respondents
were satisfied with their jobs; another one-third said they would return to craft jobs if given the
opportunity. But even among supervisors who have at least some self-managed teams under
their jurisdiction, the workloads appear daunting. According to one such supervisor, "My span of
control has tripled ...I work 14 hours a day, five days a week.... I’m fully accountable if anything
goes wrong. Supervisors now spend 60 percent of their time doing paperwork. High stress.
Performance is slipping some. We used to make two or three visits a day to each worker. You'd
go out and find out how he's doing. Now I see each worker once a week."
The company in this case study has used the experience from self-managed teams to
redesign supervisors' jobs and reduce their administrative work from roughly sixty percent of
their time to ten percent. Under the piloted job redesign, coaches would spend fifty percent of
their time in the field training and developing workers. The job redesign has not been
implemented, however, because of more macro-level organizational restructuring.
In the survey conducted for this study, despite the fact that SMTs are clearly equated
with fewer supervisor jobs, there was surprisingly broadbased support for the idea. Sixty-eight
percent of all network managers and 85 percent of customer services managers supported their
use. Moreover, the support was higher among first line supervisors (71 percent) who according
to conventional literature should have the most to lose, than middle managers (57 percent)i.
Regardless of whether managers had direct experience with these teams or not, approximately
three-quarters saw the benefit to teams in the increased cooperation and sense of ow ership
over work that members have.
For middle level managers responsible for local or district level operations, the company
has used total quality concepts to create small, cross-functional business units known as
"district operations councils", in contrast to the past when middle managers had little discretion
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and reported through department hierarchies to state level officials. The district councils, local
geographic units established at divestiture and made up of local managers from different
departments, had functioned in the 1980s primarily as vehicles for public relations, employee
involvement in community affairs, and the telephone company's interface with the regulatory
environment. Local managers maintained departmental turf and interacted little beyond monthly
council meetings. Under the total quality program, the new role for the district operations
councils is to improve service quality, maximize revenues, and control costs. Legislative and
regulatory became secondary; coordination of community activities was discontinued. Councils
took responsibility for initiating quality action teams to solve particular problems or initiate
workplace innovations such as self-managed teams. Newly revised customer service reports
provided data at the local level, rather than at the state level as had previously occurred. While
the district operations councils still do not constitute profit centers, they come much closer to the
concept of cost centers than historically.
Conceptually this reform represents a change not only from centralized to decentralized,
and functional to more collaborative ways of operating, but from a focus on public service to
individual customer service, from actions such as community service that present the collective
face of the company, to actions designed to respond to individual customer service
requirements or complaints. For middle managers, this requires not only a shift in skills away
from the regulatory environment and towards business, marketing, and human resource
management. More importantly, some managers believe the new mission runs counter to the
moral and ethical principles upon which their public service careers were built. This reaction was
evident in qualitative interviews with managers as well as in their survey responses; for
example, while 86 percent of all managers said their work gave them a sense of
accomplishment, only 40 percent agreed with top management's strategic direction for the
company; and only 29 percent said that their values were similar to those of the company.
Another dimension of change was the inclusion of local union presidents in the district
operations councils. In order to gain union support for the quality program, top management
negotiated a multi-tiered partnership structure with the regional union leadership, and then
mandated that all middle managers should work with their local union counterparts. This design
was to overcome the historic problem that one top manager described, "We always seem to
jump over the middle manager." While some local presidents had begun participating in that
portion of the council meetings pertaining to the joint Quality of Worklife program (QWL), the
new mandate was for them to participate in the regular monthly business meetings of the district
council.
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The responses of middle and lower level managers to survey questions concerning the
changing nature of their jobs and skills is consistent with much of the above description of
organizational change4 (See Table IIIa). The overall picture that emerges from survey data is of
managers in the midst of a transition to a more decentralized and participatory culture along
some dimensions of work, but constrained and frustrated by top management decisions with
respect to cost-cutting and downsizing.
------------------------------
Insert Table IIIa Here
-------------------------------
Ninety-three percent of all managers said the skill needed for their jobs were changing,
but the kinds of new skills varied significantly by managerial level. Over 60 percent of lower level
managers in customer services cited technical (computer) skills as the most important new
ones, whereas 75 percent of middle managers cited "soft" skills in leadership, general
management, quality, and labor relations. The pattern was similar, but less pronounced in
network, where 53 percent of lower managers ranked new technical skills in first place and sixty
percent of middle managers ranked soft skills as the critical new ones.5
With respect to the decentralization of decision-making, the evidence supports the notion
that lower level managers are experiencing more discretion, but diffusion is uneven. On the one
hand, over 55% of all managers said that their discretion to make decisions to meet customer
needs had increased in the last two years; and consistent with this pattern, a substantial
minority (47% of network and 42% of customer services) said that tile amount of supervision
they receive had decreased in the same period. On the other hand, a majority (53%) also said
they that bureaucratic rules and procedures continued frequently to obstruct their ability to meet
customer needs. Moreover, with respect to changes in control over tasks and work pace,
responses were relatively evenly divided between those who experienced greater control, less
control, and no change.
Surprisingly, however, and contrary to the image that exists of managers in a large
bureaucracy with little discretion over their jobs, 59% of all managers said they had complete or
"a lot" of control over the tasks, procedures, and pace of their work, and these responses did
not vary significantly by department. This is surprising because historically customer service
jobs are viewed as more constrained and easily regulated than network jobs that are more
widely decentralized and require flexibility to respond to the local outside network environment.
While this difference may exist among frontline workers, it does not seem to cant' over into
lower and middle level managerial jobs.
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The evolution of a more participatory culture is also evident: three-quart rs of the
managers surveyed had participated in at least one form of collaborative or problem-solving
team: quality action, QWL, cross-functional, or problem-solving team; 10 percent had
participated in all four. Participation, however, increased by management level, even after
controlling for tenure. In other words, although there is a growing collaborative or participative
culture, it is more available to those higher up in management. These patterns did not vary
significantly by department The differences in participation rates across levels of management
are reflected in different levels of satisfaction expressed by managers concerning their
involvement in decision-making: whereas 72% of middle managers in network were satisfied
with their participation, only 55 percent of lower managers were satisfied. The pattern is similar
in customer services, although the overall rates of satisfaction are higher. In sum, managers
show great interest in increased decision-making responsibility.
They are also highly supportive of the new partnership with the union, contrary to the
conventional wisdom concerning middle management resistance to labor-man gement
participation. Ninety- wo percent of all managers said they supported union participation in total
quality; 86 percent said it was critical to the success of total quality and 75 percent it was
necessary for the success of self-managed teams. Over 90 percent of district managers said
that local union presidents participated in monthly district council meetings; and fifty-three
percent also invited them to regular staff meetings.
Among middle level managers at the district level, evidence of increased discretion is
mixed. On the one hand, they indicate they have considerable (complete or a lot of) control over
decisions regarding quality (82%), human resource practices such as training beyond what is
required by the company (64%), and industrial relations (76%). A majority (60%) says that their
control over quality has increased over the last two years, and a substantial minority (47%) also
note an increase in their authority over labor relations matters. On the other hand, in network
where district level managers are responsible for managing their capital budget, the majority
(57%) say they have only some or little control over these budgets and 57% say that this control
has declined in the last two years. Many of these managers experienced a cuts in their capital
and training budgets in 1993 and 1994. Some are resentful and view their budget cuts as
financing investments on the non-regulated side of the business.
For the majority of managers at all levels, downsizing has had a significant effect on
workloads and staffing levels. Ninety-three percent of all managers said their workload had
increased over the last two years, and this response did not vary significantly by department or
managerial level. Sixty-three percent of all managers (68% of network and 52% of customer
From Bureaucracy to Enterprise                                                                                                                                      WP 95-05
 Page 20
services) said they worked ten hours or more each day, and over 60% said they had more
overtime or take-home work than they wanted. Sixty percent (64% in network and 51% in
customer services) said they were always or quite frequently understaffed. These higher
workloads are reflected in increased spans of control. Seventy-two percent of all managers say
that their span of control has increased, with a significantly greater percentage (82 percent) in
customer services than in network (67 percent). Almost 40 percent of those with enlarged spans
of control now supervise 3 to 5 additional workers; another 37 percent manage between six and
fifteen additional workers. Traditionally, the standard size of work groups in network was 6
workers, and in customer services, 10 (See Table IIIb).
--------------------------------
Insert Table IIIb Here
---------------------------------
Changing Internal Labor Markets
Downsizing has also, at least during this period of transition, reduced overall mobility
throughout management. Although job ladders on paper have not changed, movement has
halted. In 1990, for example, approximately 5 percent of managers were promoted to higher pay
grades, a fraction of what existed in the 1950s through 1970s when Howard and Bray did their
study. Moreover, approximately the same number of managers were promoted in 1990 as in
1991-1993 combined; and the very small number of new managers hired from the outside in
1990 was still over twice the combined total of new hires for 1991-1993. Gender-based
occupational segregation has historically reduced lateral mobility and continues to do so: while
31 percent of the managers in the sample were female, they were concentrated in customer
services (71 percent female) and underrepresented in network (14 percent).
Interviews with managers indicate that downsizing also reduces requests for lateral
transfers: managers don't want to risk losing their "sponsorship" and joining a new department
where they will be the new person, a relative unknown to a new supervisor who will evaluate
them. Interviewees also related stories of managers reluctant to take advantage of opportunities
for mid-career educational programs or international experience for fear that ("out of sight, out of
mind") their departments would have learned that they were dispensable, their jobs would have
been eliminated, and they would face less attractive job prospects or the necessity to relocate in
order to have a job at all. In response to survey questions, 92% of managers said job security
had decreased, 89% said that opportunities for promotion had declined, 80% said that
opportunities for mobility had decreased. A large minority (38%) said they had had to relocate in
the past 3 years as a result of organizational restructuring.
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Finally, the company has introduced a new managerial performance evaluation and
compensation system that ties jobs more closely to external market conditions and links pay to
performance. It reduces managerial job classifications from 3,600 to 2,000, largely by
eliminating departmental distinctions and creating short descriptions of broad responsibilities
rather than detailed lists of specific tasks. The new compensation plan shins from a
salary-based plan built around internal equity to a variable-based system linked more closely to
the external market. Rather than moving to broadbanding with a number of gradations in each
band, the company expanded the number of pay grades from eight to fifteen, a change that
allows the company to more accurately link internal rates with external variation. To promote
pay-for-performance, the company moved from more or less across the board increases to a
forced distribution system. In the past, virtually all managers received a top rating in a three
point scale and therefore gained the maximum amount in annual pay raises available. Under the
new system, managers receive between 80% and 120% of their grade, but a forced distribution
means that supervisors will be forced to differentiate more between high and low performers
among their subordinates. In addition, 10 percent of salary continues to be at risk (a innovation
since divestiture), with group payouts dependent upon financial and service performance.
In summary, managers show mixed reaction to the dramatic changes in their jobs and
careers. While they like their jobs and the opportunity for greater participation in
decision-making, they are highly dissatisfied with opportunities for advancement and corporate
leadership more generally. Whereas less than twenty percent are satisfied with their
employment security or opportunities for advancement, seventy-eight percent are satisfied with
their jobs and 68 percent with their participation in decisions. They appear to be a hard-working
and reliable workforce. Eighty-four percent reported having zero absences in 1993. Most score
high on commitment variables: 61 percent say they are willing to work harder for the company,
60 percent say they are proud to work for the company, and 56 percent say they are loyal. By
contrast, they see a gap between themselves and top management. Only 31 percent agree with
top management's resource allocation decisions, only 29 percent believe top management is
committed to quality, and only 19 percent think that top management is considers employee
interests in making organizational decisions. In other words, while they feel committed to the
organization, they are critical of top management's commitment to them (See Table IIIc).
-----------------------------
 Insert Table IIIc Here
-----------------------------
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Conclusions: Implications for Internal Labor Market Theory
Managers in the old Bell system grew up in internal labor markets that closely resembled
the classic industrial ladders described by Doeringer and Piore (1971). Companies are in the
midst of redefining those markets to simulate external market-like conditions in an enterprise
culture. A useful framework for comparing the past and future models is along four critical
dimensions: job definition, deployment, employment security, and wage rules (Osterman 1987,
1988). This comparison is outlined in Table IV. In the past jobs were defined narrowly and
functionally; managers had a small span of control and limited discretion. Technical skills were
emphasized, and lower and middle level managerial jobs focused heavily on monitoring workers
and reporting up the chain of command. A commitment to internal recruitment shaped
deployment strategies, and vertical mobility was high: nonmanagerial workers could aspire to
lower and middle level positions; college-educated recruits to first level supervisory positions
could count on long careers in middle and top management. Company-provided training was of
high quality, and company-paid tuition supported college education for managerial
advancement. Wages and benefits were generous.
----------------------------------
Insert Table IV Here
----------------------------------
Under the new system, lower and middle level managerial jobs are broader, focused on
providing quality service, and intended to involve more cross-functional collaboration. Spans of
control are double or triple what they were in the past, allowing managers less time for
traditional supervisory tasks. While self-managed teams absorb some supervisory functions,
electronic tracking replaces manual reporting. The evolution to a new coordinating or coaching
role has been identified as a significant change by researchers studying first line supervisors in
other contexts (Klein 1988; Manz and Sims 1987; Schlesinger and Klein 1987). In this sense,
the job of first line supervisors stands to be enhanced, but the ranks will be pared down. For
middle managers, greater discretion is occurring in some areas (notably in customer service,
quality, human resource management, and industrial relations), but not others (control over
resource allocation).
Training systems for managers, already quite developed and well-funded in the old Bell
system, do not appear to be undergoing dramatic change. Changes appear to be more in the
thrust of training in new areas such as knowledge of business, marketing, and the industry; and
management and leadership skills. There are much greater changes in deployment: in the break
with tradition by recruiting externally for middle and upper management positions and in the
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decline in vertical mobility. While the notion exists that more lateral mobility will occur across the
organization, current downsizing has dampened most movement overall, and it is unclear how
long this will continue. The radical departure from the past is in what may be termed "forced
lateral movement" -either due to consolidations and relocations of offices or transfers to other
nonregulated growth subsidiaries as a means of ensuring continued employment. Continuity
with the past exists in continued high levels of occupational segregation by gender. Employment
security is now contingent on skill and performance; wage rules create variable rather than fixed
pay and income security.
What is the significance of these changes for firms and managers? Do these new
practices achieve the goal of creating an enterprise culture that is more suited to new
competitive markets? The long vertical career ladders of the past created two central benefits:
first, they preserved the skill base in the industry through continuity in the training and
development of technicians and professionals; second, they built loyalty and commitment
through job and income security. They sacrificed creativity and breadth. Companies are
attempting to undo the worst excesses of bureaucratic behavior by altering internal labor market
rules to favor an enterprise culture. While gaining participation they may be losing the goodwill
of managers.
One of the effects of the new enterprise culture is to create a new cleavage -- betwe n
lower and middle managers on the one hand and top management on the other. Other
researchers have noted the contradiction in constraints imposed by top management in the
context of also promoting "entrepreneurialism" (Donaldson 1985 ). Researchers studying the
restructuring of British Telecom also found evidence of this contradiction: the devolution of
authority to middle managers turned out to be more rhetoric than reality and created high
expectations among middle managers who were subsequently demoralized when the reality
turned out to be far less than that promised (Colling and Ferrier 1992). Middle managers in the
old Bell system companies talk openly of their resentment towards top management -- who on
the one hand ask middle managers to be more committed and creative than ever in improving
quality and customer service; but on the other hand, who cut the resources needed for these
managers to accomplish this goal. On the one hand, middle managers say they are told they
have new power to make quality improvements in work processes; on the other hand,
company-wide reengineering teams announce process changes without the input of middle and
lower managers. On the one hand, middle managers are told to create an on-going learning
organization; on the other hand, they have no certainty that they will lead those organizations in
the near future.
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The extent to which these contradictions undermine quality improvements or firm
competitiveness remains to be seen, as does the extent of change in internal labor markets that
actually occurs. While company policies governing internal labor markets have changed, actual
changes in practice are lagging. The regional Bell companies, for example, have been
downsizing much more slowly than AT&T, and have resisted forced separations even when they
have been officially announced. While external recruitment is occurring to a greater extent than
in the past, these companies still maintain a strong commitment to internal promotions. While
new performance management systems have been announced, the systems of the past were
intended to differentiate "higher" and "lower" performing employees, but as implemented did
not. Changes in job design and human resource policies are difficult to implement because their
implementation often depends upon managers who stand to lose in the process. Thus, this
study captures organizations in the midst of transition, but the endpoint is still unclear; and it
may fall far short of the lean and nimble entrepreneurial player that is envisioned in current
management theory.
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Table I
Growth of Managerial Workforce at AT&T:
1950-1990*
1950 1960 1970 1980 1984 1990
AT&T Bell
 Managers
Non-managers
---------
 Total
  70,630
446,129
-----------
523,251
105,833
466,795
-----------
580,405
169,401
574,534
----------
772,980
248,562
589,939
----------
847,768
111,432
267,568
----------
379,000
115,851
137,920
----------
253,773
Managers as %
of total 13.5% 18.2% 21.9% 29.3% 29.4% 45.7%
Ratio of
Managers to
Non-mangers
1:6.3 1:4.4 1:3.4 1:2.4 1:2.4 1:1.2
% Change over
prior decade:
 Managers
Non-mangers
-----------
Total
+49.9%
+ 4.6%
---------
+10.9%
+60.1%
+23.1%
----------
+33.2%
+46.7%
+ 2.7%
----------
+ 9.7%
-55.2%
-54.5%
---------
-55.3%
+ 4.0%
-48.5%
---------
-33.0%
*Source: BellSystem Statistical Manual 1950-1980, June, 1982, AT&T Comptrollers' Office.
NY:AT&T, pp. 701-708, In Keefe (1994), Table 1. The figures for 1950 to 1980 are for the Bell
System, excluding Bell Labs (research and development) and Western Electric (manufacturing).
The 1984 and 1990 figures represent AT&T's total U.S. operations following divestiture,
including manufacturing but excluding NCR.
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Table II
Telecommunications Services
Business Strategy and Production Organization
    Components                             Old System                New System
Capital
Market
Regulated by FCC, State PUCs Partially regulated:
Sensitive to stock market
Pricing Regulated: Partially regulated:
Mechanism  Cross-subsidized  More competitive
 (local/long dist.)  "Incentive-based"
 (resident/business)  "Cost-based"
Product Standardized: Differentiated:
Market Voice Voice, data, video, image
Technology Lead, copper transmission; Fiber optic transmission;
Analog, mechanical switching Digital switching
Competitive Low cost, scale economies Cost, quality, customer service
Advantage
Business Strategy Universal public service, Segmented service markets,
"Engineering driven" "Market driven"
Management Vertical Horizontal
Structure Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial
Centralized Dual: regional/local
HR/IR Centralized Dual: regional/local
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Table IIIa
Managerial Perceptions of Changing Participation and Discretion,
(percentages of positive responses to questions)
Job Dimension All All All
Line Network Cust. Ser.
Managers Managers Managers
Middle managers: N = 41 N = 31 N = 10
Have substantial control over*
Quality programs 82 79 84
Labor relations 76 75 77
Training 64 71 58
Capital allocations 54 43 61
Have increased control over**
Training 20 21 19
Quality programs 60 63 58
Labor relations 47 42 52
Have decreased control over**
Capital budget 57 57 55
Lower Level Managers: N = 290 N = 199 N = 91
Have substantial control over*
Tasks 59 59 58
Procedures 58 57 61
Pace of work 59 58 62
Have increased control over**
Customer service 56 56 55
Tasks 34 34 27
Pace of work 29 30 25
Middle & Lower Managers N = 331 N = 230 N =101
Have participated in**
Quality teams 46 45 48
Crossfunctional teams 44 44 46
Problemsolving teams 51 49 55
QWL teams 28 26 35
Support use of SMTs** 72 68 85
Support union participation:**
   In total quality 92 92 93
* % of positive responses to yes/no question.
** % of positive responses to question (1-2 on 5-point scale).
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Table IIIb
Managerial Perceptions of Workloads and Career Opportunities
(percentages of positive responses to questions)
Job Dimension All All All
Line Network Cust. Ser.
Managers Managers Managers
Middle & Lower Level Managers N = 331 N = 230 N = 101
Workload has changed:
Larger span of control** 72 67 82
Work 10+ hours/day 63 68 52
Increased workload** 93 92 97
Too much overtime* 61 60 64
Frequent understaffing* 60 64 51
Opportunities have declined:**
Vertical promotions 89 92 82
Lateral transfers 80 83 74
Employment Security 92 91 93
Have been forced to relocate** 38 41 33
*    % of positive responses to question (12 on 5-point scale).
* * % of positive responses to yes/no question.
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Table Illc
Managerial Perceptions:
Satisfaction, Commitment, Attitudes Toward Top Management
Job Dimension All All All
                                                                            LineNetwork Cust. Ser.
                                                                        Managers   Managers Managers
Middle & Lower Managers N=331 N=230 N=101
Are satisfied with:*
Participation in decisions 68 65 75
Job 78 77 80
Sense of accomplishment 86 83 90
Job's use of skills 81 79 86
Career opportunities 17 12 28
Benefits 73 66 92
Pay 83 77 97
Company 70 64 94
Are Committed to Company:**
Willing to work harder for 61 56 72
      company
Are proud to work for company 60 53 74
Feel loyal to company 56 52 66
Had zero absences in 1993 84 87 78
Have similar values 29 24 44
Are satisfied with top
management:*
Strategic direction 40 31 58
Resource allocation 31 22 53
Commitment to quality 29 26 38
Consideration of employees 19 15 28
Demographics:
%Female 31 14 71
%White 88 92 77
%age 41-50 63 58 73
Education: means Some coll. Some coll. Some coll.
Tenure: 21 yrs or more 77 80 67
*    % of positive responses to question (1-2 on 5-point scale).
**   % of positive responses to yes/no question.
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Table IV
Implications of Organizational Change for
Managerial Internal Labor Markets
      Components                               Old ILM                                              New ILM
  Job definition     Rigidly defined, Broader,
    Narrowly functional Cross-functional
  o Span of control     1:6 1:15-30
  o Discretion     Very limited Greater in areas of
customer service, HRM/IR
  o Skill     Specific functional and Technical plus general
  requirements      technical management, leadership,
                                                                                                           HR/IR
  o Training
  Lower/middle     Co. provided technical plus Co. provided technical plus
                                          college tuition                                          quality, business, leadership
                                                                                                          training; tuition aid
  Upper     Co. paid executive ed.                            Co. paid executive ed.; more
                                                                                                          stress on finance, marketing,
industry analysis
  Deployment     Internal recruitment Internal & external
                                                                                                          recruitment
  o Mobility     High: Low:
    non-manager to mid-manager nonmanager to 1st level
    1st level to top-manager 1st level to midlevel
    Vertical/functional More lateral, external:
"forced lateral transfers"
    High occupational High occupational
                                          segregation by gender                            segregation by gender
____________________________________________________________________________
Employment security    Cradle to grave Contingent on skill and
Performance
 Wage rules     Salary-based + automatic Variable-based + 10% at risk
                                          annual raise                                             + contingent raise
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 Comparing managers who do and do not have direct experience with self-managed teams, 90
percent of those with experience supported their use; but even among those without
experience, fifty-one percent favored them. Asked directly whether self-managed teams
undermine the authority of first line supervisors, 70 percent of those with experience said rarely
or never, compared to 45 percent of the managers of traditional groups.
2 Jeff Keefe, personal communication, 8/15/94.
3  Comparing manager who do and do not have direct experience with self-managed teams, 90
percent of those with experience supported their use; but even among those without
experience, fifty-one percent favored them.  Asked directly whether self-managed teams
undermine the authority of first line supervisors, 70 percent of those with experience said rarely
or never, compared to 45 percent of the managers of traditional groups.
4 The data consists of 331 line managers in two core departments – network and customer
services.  About two-thirds of the respondents are from network and one-third from customer
services, reflecting the relative size of the workforce in each of these departments.  The survey
asked three levels of managers in each department (middle, lower middle, and first line) a series
of questions concerning changes in the job characteristics, skill requirements, work
organization, and human resource practices in the firm.
5  Surprisingly, over 50% of managers said that opportunities for training had not changed, and
over 70 percent said that more training was not a high priority; most managers responded that
their training was adequate.  Two interpretations are plausible:  This may reflect the fact that the
old Bell system companies have historically invested heavily in training (currently at 3.5 percent
of payroll in this company); alternatively, it may be that managers are reluctant to admit their
skill deficiencies.
